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TAX LAW 
NINTH CIRCUIT REJECTS PRESUMPTION 
OF DISGUISED DIVIDENDS SOLELY BASED 
ON A LACK OF DIVIDEND PAYMENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Elliots, Inc. v. Commissioner,l the Ninth Circuit, rejected 
the McCandless automatic dividend2 rule and held that the ab-
sence of dividends, combined with the presence of a sole officer-
shareholder of a profitable corporation, does not automatically 
lead to the presumption that compensation payments necessa-
rily contain disguised dividends.3 
Elliots, Inc. (the corporation) was an Idaho corporation en-
gaged in the business of selling equipment manufactured by 
John Deere Company." Edward G. Elliot (Elliot) served as the 
chief executive officer since the entity was incorporated in 1952 
and as the sole shareholder since 1954.11 The corporation, though 
1. 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were Skopil, 
J. and Fletcher, J.). 
2. Charles McCandless Tile Servo V. United States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970). In 
McCandless, the Court of Claims found that compensation payments, although reasona-
ble in amount, "necessarily" contained disguised dividends. The court presumed that 
dividends were being hidden because the corporation had been profitable yet had not 
paid any dividends since it was incorporated. Id. at 1339-40. The label "automatic divi-
dend" was first applied to the McCandless case in Holden, Has Court of Claims 
Adopted an "Automatic Dividend" Rule in Compensation Cases? 32 J. TAX 331 (1970). 
The term implies application beyond the facts of McCandless. 
3. The court reviewed the Tax Court's definition and application of the factors that 
determine reasonable compensation. The court reversed the finding that the compensa-
tion received was intended to distribute profits and remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion under the analysis outlined in the opinion. 716 F.2d at 1248. 
4. Id. at 1242. The corporation experienced gross sales of $500,000 in 1952 when it 
was originally incorporated and expanded to gross sales of over 5 million dollars with 40 
employees in 1975. Id. 
5. Id. His duties included total managerial responsibility, the making of ultimate 
policy decisions, the roles of sales and credit manager and decision making for the parts 
and service departments. Elliot worked an average of 80 hours per week. Id. 
171 
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profitable,8 never paid a dividend.7 
The corporation had paid Elliot a base salary of $2000 per 
month for several years, including the years 1975 and 1976 
which were the years questioned in the IRS's notice of defi-
ciency.8 In addition, Elliot received bonuses equivalent to fifty 
percent of the corporation's net profits before deduction of in-
come taxes and management bonuses.9 The bonuses were based 
on a predetermined formula, consistently applied since the time 
of incorporation.1o 
6. Elliots Inc. v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M.(CCH) 802, 804 (1980), reu'd 716 F.2d 1241 (9th 
Cir. 1983). Elliots Inc.'s net profits were as follows: 
Fiscal Year Ending Net Profits· After Tax Profits 
February 28 
1968. 
1969. 
.... $ 25,090 ......... , . .... $19,715 
1970 ................. . 
1971 .. 
1972. 
1973. 
1974. 
1975. 
1976. 
1977. 
1978 .. 
5,635. 
27,042 ........... . 
77,569. 
59,873 ............ . 
57,951. .......... . 
112,536 ........... . 
157,074 .......... . 
169,663 .......... . 
129,696. 
59,052 .......... . 
4,206 
19,190 
43,934 
36,713 
37,268 
63,674 
88,969 
98,297 
78,250 
42,860 
·After salary to Mr. Elliot and before State and Federal Income Taxes. 
40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 804. 
7. 716 F.2d at 1247. 
8. [d. at 1242. 
9. [d. Mr. Elliot was paid as president and general manager of Elliots Inc. as follows: 
Fiscal Year Ending 
February 28 
1968 .. 
1969 .. 
1970. 
1971 .. . 
1972 ......... . 
1973 .. 
1974. 
1975 .. 
1976. 
1977 .. 
1978 .. 
40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 804. 
Total Compensation 
Paid to Mr. Elliott 
. ..... $ 42,800 
19,600 
34,035 
84,450 
68,323 
66,401 
136,536 
181,074 
193,663 
153,696 
83,052 
10. [d. The ability to show that contingent compensation is based on a formula, that 
has been in effect for an extended period of time, is important and good record keeping 
can make the difference. The crucial issue seems to be that the system was predeter-
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/10
1985] TAX LAW 173 
The corporation deducted $181,074 and $191,633 as com-
pensation paid to Elliot for the fiscal years ending in 1975 and 
1976 respectively.ll However, the Internal Revenue Service is-
sued a notice of deficiency and limited the deduction to $65,000 
for each fiscal year.I2 The corporation petitioned the Tax Court 
for a redetermination of liability and subsequently the defi-
ciency was reduced. Ho~ever, the court determined that the 
payments to the employee-shareholder were both compensation 
for personal services and disguised dividends and concluded that 
the total amount paid was in excess of reasonable compensa-
tion. I3 The corporation appealed the Tax Court's holding regard-
ing the level of reasonable compensation to the Ninth Circuit, 
contending that the court ignored the amount of compensation 
mined and the inference that the method is being put forward only as a result of litiga-
tion should be avoided. The Ninth Circuit advanced such a perspective in Pacific Grains 
v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1968): 
The failure of the taxpayer's Board of Directors to earmark 
the funds as being in part for prior services and the lack of 
any showing as to what percentage of the compensation was 
intended for the respective periods give support to the Com-
missioner's contention that the taxpayer's theory of compensa-
tion for prior services was only an afterthought developed at a 
time when the reasonableness of the compensation was al-
ready under attack. 
399 F.2d at 606. 
11. 716 F.2d at 1242. 
12. [d. The Commissioner's notice of deficiency contained the following explanation: 
It is determined that compensation paid to Edward G. Elliot 
during the taxable years ended 2/28/75 and 2/28/76 is exces-
sive in amounts of $116,073.71 and 128,662.91, respectively. 
Such amounts exceed a reasonable allowance for salaries and 
other compensation for personal services rendered within the 
ambit of section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 809. 
13. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 813. The Tax Court did not allow the fact that Elliot's com-
pensation was based on a contingent formula to enter into their analysis: 
[d. 
Based on the record as a whole, and considering (1) the nature 
of the work done by Mr. Elliot, (2) the hours he worked, (3) 
the lack of difference in his work in the years here in issue and 
prior years, (4) the fact that in many instances salaries paid by 
other John Deere dealers were paid to more than one individ-
ual, and (5) the level of salaries paid by petitioner to executive 
employees other than Mr. Elliot, we conclude that reasonable 
compensation for petitioner's fiscal years ending February 28, 
1975 and February 28, 1976 was $120,000 and $125,000 respec-
tively. We therefore sustain respondent's disallowance of peti-
tioner's claimed deduction for compensation paid to Mr. Elliot 
which is in excess of these amounts. 
3
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paid to Elliot in prior and succeeding years under the formula. 14 
II. BACKGROUND 
Section 162(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code allows rea-
sonable compensation payments but not dividend payments to 
be de4ucted as ordinary and necessary business expenses by cor-
porations. 11I Because dividends are includable in the gross in-
come of the recipient and also as corporate distributions out of 
current or accumulated earnings and profits, an incentive exists 
for labeling the payments as compensation to avoid a double tax 
on the distribution. IS However, shareholder-employees are taxed 
at the same level for both dividends and wages regardless of the 
payment's characterization.17 Yet, officer-shareholders with sig-
nificant holdings may prefer to receive dividends in the guise of 
compensation in order to further the interests of the corporation 
and their own interests as shareholders. 
14. 716 F.2d at 1242. See also Brief for Appellant at 4, 716 F.2d 1241. 
15. I.R.C. § 162(a)(I)(West 1978). The section provides: 
"(a) In general.- There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, 
including. (1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal ser-
vices actually rendered. . . . " [d. 
The issue in most cases is "what is reasonable?" Although subordinate to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, the Treasury Regulations can be looked to for interpretive aid. The 
regulation illustrates practical application of the code: 
In any event the allowance for the compensation paid may not 
exceed what is reasonable under all the circumstances. It is, in 
general, just to assume that reasonable and true compensation 
is only such amount as would ordinarily be paid for like ser-
vices under like circumstances. The circumstances to be taken 
into consideration are those existing at the date when the con-
tract for services was made, not those existing at the date 
when the contract is questioned. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3), T.D. 6500, 1983-15 C.B. 658. Further interpretation of the 
Treasury Regulation is found in judicial interpretation of what constitutes "like services 
under like circumstances." This is essentially a fact question. 
[d. 
16. I.R.C. § 316(a) and § 301(c)(I)(West 1978). 
17. 716 F.2d at 1243 n.2. 
Moreover, for payments made between 1971 and 1981, as is 
the case here, a high income recipient has a strong incentive to 
characterize such payments as compensation rather than divi-
dends: pre·1982 dividends are taxable at a maximum rate of 
70% while the maximum tax rate for wages received between 
1971 and 1981 is 50%. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (amended 1983) and § 
1348 (repealed 1981). (Since 1982, the maximum tax rate for 
both wages and dividends has been 50%. 26 U.S.C. § 1 
(1982». 
4
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. The determination of reasonable compensation has followed 
the two prong test contained in Treasury Regulation section 
1.162-7(a).18 Under the first prong of this test, it is necessary to 
determine if the amount of compensation is reasonable.19 Al-
though the interpretation by courts as to what is reasonable has 
varied from case to case, several guidelines are important in 
making the reasonableness interpretation.20 These include the 
employee's qualifications, the nature of the position, complexi-
ties of the business and industry customs and economic condi-
tions in general. 21 
18. "The test of deductibility in the case of compensation payments is whether they 
are reasonable and are in fact payments purely for services." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a), 
T.D. 6500, 1983-15 C.B. 657. 
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3), T.D. 6500, 1983-15 C.B. 658. An example of the ap-
proach utilizing the amount paid as a gauge of reasonableness is found in Klamath Med. 
Servo Bureau V. Comm'r, 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1959)(the corporation sold prepaid medi-
cal plans and contracted to pay physicians for their services according to a schedule of 
base fees under a complex formula.): 
[d. at 844. 
The Tax Court specifically found that while the fee schedule 
was unreasonably low when compared to like services and pro-
cedures and compensation charged therefor by physicians in 
private practice, it was equitable and fair when the lessened 
costs to doctors rendering services under the plan (which less-
ened costs are attributable to taxpayer's operation) were con-
sidered. None of the fees set were unreasonable in amount, 
and it was held that 100 percent of the billings of physicians 
constituted reasonable compensation for the services for which 
taxpayer was billed. 
20. Miller Mfg. CO. V. Comm'r, 149 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1945). "These facts and cir-
cumstances vary so widely that each corporate tub must more or less stand upon its own 
bottom." [d. at 423. 
21. A much cited summary of factors to be considered is found in Mayson Mfg. CO. 
V. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949): 
[lIt is well settled that several basic factors should be consid-
ered by the Court in reaching its decision in any particular 
case. Such factors include the employee's qualifications; the 
nature, extent and scope of the employee's work; the size and 
complexities of the business; a comparison of salaries paid 
with the gross income and the net income; the prevailing gen-
eral economic conditions; comparison of salaries with distribu-
tions to stockholders; the prevailing rates of compensation for 
comparable positions in comparable concerns; the salary pol-
icy of the taxpayer as to all employees; and in the case of 
small corporations with a limited number of officers, the 
amount of compensation paid to the particular employee in 
previous years. 
[d. at 119. The Court of Claims laid out a set of guidelines in Irby Constr. CO. V. United 
States, 290 F.2d 824 (1961): 
The inquiry as to the reasonableness of compensation in a 
5
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The second prong analyzes whether the payments were 
made "purely for services."22 It examines "intent" in specific sit-
uations where the compensation was paid to persons with what 
appear to be less than arms-length relationships, such as family 
members or employee-shareholders.23 However, the lack of divi-
[d. at 826. 
given instance is not without some guides. At various times 
courts have looked to such things as the amounts paid by sim-
ilar enterprises for services of a like character; the type and 
extent of services rendered by the employee; the scarcity of 
qualified employees for the position; the prior earning capacity 
of the employee; the peculiar characteristics of the taxpayer's 
business, and the general economic conditions of the period. 
22. Payments in excess of 100% of the amount agreed upon by contract have been 
disallowed as distributions of corporate income. Klamath, 261 F.2d at 845. In Klamath 
Med.Serv. Bureau v. Comm'r, 29 T.C. 339 (1957),aff'd 261 F.2d at 845, the Tax Court 
examined whether the payments were purely for services as follows: 
We think it must be concluded from this record that, with re-
spect to that portion of the payments here involved which ex-
ceeds 100 per cent of the billings of petitioner's staff doctors, 
such payments were distributions of petitioner's profits and 
earnings. We are led to this conclusion because of the contract 
under which petitioner was bound to pay its member doctors 
for their services rendered. That instrument is ambiguous with 
respect to the compensation for such services. It does not spe-
cifically provide for the payment of over 100 per cent of the 
billings for such services but does provide specifically that the 
billings be in accordance with its fee schedule .... It seems 
clear from this that petitioner has contracted with its member 
physicians that they will render their services to petitioner for 
fees equal to its fee schedule regardless of the fact that such 
fees may be in some instances below reasonable compensation 
therefor. 
29 T.C. at 347-48. 
Another indicator that the payment is not "purely for services" is that the only 
employees receiving bonuses are employee-stockholders and the bonuses received are in 
proportion to their holdings: 
Each of the bonus payments and administrative salary pay-
ments made by Nor-Cal to its four officer-shareholders during 
the year in issue was exactly proportionate to the recipient's 
respective stockholding in Nor-Cal. Taxpayer also employed 
three other insurance adjusters during 1967 but none of those 
individuals received bonuses in any way comparable to the of-
ficer-shareholders. 
Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Comm'r, 503 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1974). 
23. In Nor-Cal, the factors that were determinative in finding that the compensa-
tion at issue was not payment for services actually rendered were: 
1. The bonuses were in exact proportion to the officer's 
stockholdings; 
2. Payments were in lump sums rather than as the services 
were rendered; 
6
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dends in and of itself was not indicative of a disguised dividend 
until McCandless Tile Service v. Commissioner.Z4 
In McCandless, the Court of Claims211 held that the amounts 
3. There was a complete absence of formal dividend distribu-
tions by an expanding corporation; 
4. The system of bonuses were completely unstructured; i.e., 
bonuses were computed periodically throughout the year on 
no apparent pre-set basis; 
5. Taxpayers consistently negligible taxable income was an in-
dication that the bonus system was based on funds available 
rather than services rendered; 
6. The stock redemption agreement between Nor-Cal and 
Hobson [Hobson was president of Nor-Cal and a 35% share-
holder.l; and 
7. Bonus payments were made only to the officer-stockholders. 
503 F.2d at 362. 
24. 422 F.2d at 1339. See Bringwald, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.2d 639 (Ct.CI. 
1964). "Certainly the mere fact that a corporation has never paid any dividend would 
not, in and of itself, justify the conclusion that the salaries paid to an employee share-
holder were a distribution of a dividend. There may be varied business reasons for the 
corporation to refrain from distributing dividends." [d. at 644. 
25. There are three forums available to the taxpayer who wishes to fight a notice of 
deficiency: the Tax Court of the United States, the United States district courts and the 
United States Court of Claims. There are no jurisdictional requirements or limitations as 
to the amount in controversy for any of the three courts. The district courts and Court of 
Claims handle any federal tax assessment issues. The Tax Court's jurisdiction is limited 
to cases involving income, estate, gift and excess profit taxes. The most important differ-
ence is that the taxpayer must pay the disputed tax in full before an action maybe 
brought in the Court of Claims or the district court. A jury trial is available only in the 
district court. L. PONDER, UNITED STATES TAX COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 24-27 
(1976). 
The Tax Court views itself as a national court. Originally this attitude was reflected 
in Arthur L. Lawrence v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 713, 716-20(1957), rev'd 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 
1958), overruled, 54 T.C. 742, 757(1970): 
The Tax Court has always believed that Congress in-
tended it to decide all cases uniformly, regardless of where, in 
its nation-wide jurisdiction, they may arise, and that it could 
not perform its assigned functions properly were it to decide 
one case one way and another differently merely because ap-
peals in such cases might go to the different Courts of 
Appeals .... 
27 T.C. at 718. 
That viewpoint was modified in Jack E. Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970): 
Notwithstanding a number of the considerations which 
originally led us to that decision [Lawrencel, it is our best 
judgment that better judicial administration. [sicl (footnote 
ommitted) requires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision 
which is squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies 
to that Court of Appeals and to that court alone (footnote 
ommitted). 
[d. The taxpayer must examine the precedent in the courts of appeals in the circuit in 
7
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paid as compensation, although reasonable, contained a dis-
guised dividend26 because the corporation had not declared any 
dividends since its formation.27 Two fifty-percent officer share-
holders were paid compensation equal to fifty-percent of the cor-
poration's net profits.28 The court recognized the outstanding 
management ability of the two employee-stockholders and con-
ceded that the corporation's success and large profits were at-
tributable to their hard work and dedication.2s The unique re-
which the case may be brought. These prior decisions will be influential to a varying 
degree depending on the court chosen. The district courts pay close attention to the 
views of the higher federal courts. The Court of Claims has overruled itself on more than 
one occassion and so may rule favorably despite a prior adverse decision. B. LANE AND J. 
HAMOVIT. THE PREPARATION OF TAX REFUND CASES IN THE DISTRICT COURTS AND COURT 
OF CLAIMS. 12-25 (1964). A Court of Claims decision, such as McCandless, could only be 
appealed to the Supreme Court at the time the Elliots litigation was initiated. However, 
decisions of all three courts can be appealed to courts of appeals now, which will alter 
some of the precedential value of future decisions of the various courts. 
26. Based on an examination of the entire record, the court determined that there 
should have been a 15% return on equity capital. This figure was based on net profits 
before salaries and federal income tax. The court concluded that this 15% return had 
been distributed via the compensation payments. 422 F.2d at 1340. 
27. The Ninth Circuit took a similar approach in Pacific Grains. The court made 
the following observations regarding profitability and dividends: 
The taxpayer notes that the business was doing well with a 
high rate of return on the investment. This success certainly 
presents an argument that high salaries might be justified. 
However, it is also consistent with the Commissioner's argu-
ment that the taxpayer should have been paying dividends 
and that the high salary paid to its sole shareholder was 
merely a method of draining off corporate profits at a tax 
advantage. 
399 F.2d at 606. The court decided that "[r)ather than declare dividends, the Board paid 
him a high salary." [d. at 607. The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Elliot radically alters this 
"either-or" approach. 716 F.2d at 1246. 
28. The court stated that there was some indication, based on review of a "compara-
ble company," that the McCandlesses were entitled to greater compensation. 422 F.2d at 
1339. 
29. [d. The court reasoned as follows: 
There can be little doubt on the record here that plaintiff's 
impressive net profit showing during the years in question has 
been due in large measure to the long experience, outstanding 
executive abilities, and hard work of Charles S. and Charles L. 
McCandless. The evidence is persuasive, moreover, that it 
would be extremely difficult for plaintiff to replace these two 
officers within any reasonable period of time. In short, the Mc-
Candlesses have placed [sic) a critical role in, and are largely 
responsible for, plaintiff's extremely successful operations. 
[d. The McCandless court also attributed the success of the company to the shareholder 
roles: "supplying risk capital, assuming corporate obligations and participating in corpo-
rate decisions." [d. at 1340. This focus may be responsible for the unique result in Mc-
Candless. After all, the shareholder-employee is entitled to wages as an employee, which 
8
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suIt of this case turned on the emphasis the court gave to the 
lack of dividends. so However, McCandless has been the subject 
of much criticism regarding the application of the "automatic 
dividend" rule.sl 
The McCandless court applied the language of section 
1.162-7(b)(1) of the Treasury Regulationss2 which cautions that 
where salaries are not r~asonable in comparison to those of simi-
lar businesses and the payments correspond to the percentage of 
are an immediate return on time devoted to the job. He is also entitled to a return on his 
investment as a shareholder but it may not always be in his best interest to receive an 
immediate return as a dividend. He may prefer, if given the choice, to reinvest profits 
and gain a larger future return. The McCandless case, strictly interpreted, requires that 
the compensation reflect a return on both roles if no dividends are paid. If the compen-
sation was found to be in excess of reasonable, the labeling of the excess as a disguised 
dividend would not cut into the amount determined to be reasonable for the employee 
role. However, a less equitable result is obtained if the amount is determined to be rea-
sonable and therefore the mandatory dividend has to be supplied by subtracting it from 
the reasonable compensation for the employee role. This results in a sacrifice of the com-
pensation for the employee role to satisfy the shareholder role. This approach is tenta-
tive at best when the amount of influence that a shareholder has on the success of a 
corporation is examined. 
The shareholder's role generally includes voting for directors and investing money 
but not direct responsibility for fine tuning an organization. One commentator has 
pointed out that "[ilt is difficult to accept the argument that the stockholders were re-
sponsible for the success of the company and shol,lld be compensated therefore as a re-
sult of their participation in corporate decisions. Stockholders as such are compensated 
for the use of their money." O'Neill, Reasonable, but Nondeductible, "Compensation"? 
57 A.B.A.J. 82, 84 (1971). The segregation of the distinct roles of investor-shareholder 
and officer-employee is even more important in a sole shareholder case such as Elliots. 
30. "We think it clear that any return on equity capital is so conspicuous by its 
absence as to indicate, given all the facts, that the purported compensation payments 
necessarily contained a distribution of corporate earnings within." 422 F.2d at 1339-40. 
31. Coggin, The Status of the McCandless Doctrine, 55 TAXES 720 (1976); Walthall, 
McCandless-Implications for Compensation Planning and Dividend Policy, 6 CUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1975); Note, Reasonable Compensation, 26 STAN. L. REV. 441 (1973). 
32. The Treasury Regulation states in part: 
Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in fact 
as the purchase price of services, is not deductible. An ostensi-
ble salary paid by a corporation may be a distribution of a 
dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of a cor-
poration having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw 
salaries. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of those 
ordinarily paid for similar services and the excessive payments 
correspond or bear a close relationship to the stockholdings of 
the officers or employees, it would seem likely (emphasis 
added) that the salaries are not paid wholly for services ren-
dered, but that the excessive (emphasis added) payments are 
a distribution of earnings on the stock. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1). 
9
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stockholdings, it is "likely" that the "excessive" compensation is 
a disguised dividend.88 The court focused on the lack of divi-
dends and ignored their finding that the compensation was rea-
sonable. Despite the lack of "excessive" payments, their scrutiny 
uncovered disguised dividends.84 McCandless has been fre-
quently cited by the government81i in disguised dividend cases 
for various propositions, however, no court has automatically ap-
plied the rule as was done in McCandless. 86 
In 1974, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of contingent 
compensation and a lack of dividends in Nor-Cal Adjusters v. 
Commissioner.87 Significantly, the court did not cite McCand-
1d. 
33. 422 F.2d at 1339. 
34. 1d. at 1340. 
Implicit in our earlier discussion of reasonable compensa-
tion is the attitude that a corporation's highly efficient opera-
tion and its clearly demonstrated profit-making ability justify 
substantial compensation to the officers responsible therefore. 
As such performance justifies substantial compensation, we 
are of the further view that it also justifies a substantial in-
vestment return. Perhaps this is especially true with respect to 
a closely held corporation where the opportunity to distribute 
corporate earnings as compensation is most readily available 
and, as here, compensation is in fact in proportion to the 
stockholdings of the principle stockholders. 
35. In Elliots, the government utilized McCandless for both the proposition that the 
lack of dividends was strong evidence in favor of a finding of disguised dividends and 
that 15% of the company profits were dividends, not compensation. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 
810. However, the Commissioner dropped the 15% figure in the brief for the appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit. "A substantial return on investment for stockholders would ordinarily 
be expected from such successful operations and the absence of a profit distribution to 
stockholder justifies the inference that some of the purported compensation really repre-
sents a distribution of taxpayer's profits." Brief for Appellee at 28, Elliots, 716 F.2d 
1241. Notice the similarity to the language in McCandless. See supra note 34. 
36. The lack of dividends paid by a group of profitable companies was taken as an 
inference that the compensation contained a partial distribution of profits. Charles 
Schneider and Co. v. Comm'r, 500 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1974). The Schneider court cited 
McCandless for this proposition but did not automatically conclude that part of the 
compensation was not purely for services on that basis alone. The court pointed out that 
the contingent bonuses based on percentages of annual net sales and profits left little to 
be paid out as dividends even though the companies were profitable. The fact that the 
employee-shareholder spent less time at work and his pay increased during that period 
was also seen as significant. Comparisons made to prevailing rates paid to persons in 
similar positions within the furniture and upholstery manufacturing industry showed the 
compensation to be grossly disproportionate to similar sized companies. The bonuses 
were two to three times what was paid in the industry. In this factual setting, the lack of 
dividends was indicative of disguised dividends, but not controlling. 500 F.2d at 153-54. 
37. 503 F.2d at 361. Nor-Cal involved contingent bonuses to officer-shareholders in 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/10
1985] TAX LAW 181 
less, although the Tax Court opini~n which was affirmed did re-
fer to the case.88 
In Nor-Cal, the Tax Court cited McCandless for the pro-
position that the compensation, though reasonable, could still 
contain a disguised dividend.89 The Ninth Circuit gave cursory 
treatment to the Tax Court's findings and affirmed the deci-
sion.40 The Ninth Circuit's language41 closely resembled a Mc-
Candless analysis.42 
In Edwins, Inc. v. United States,48 the Seventh Circuit rele-
gated the importance of the lack of dividends to that of a "red 
flag" and stressed that it was only one factor in determining rea-
sonable compensation.44 This treatment of the automatic divi-
dend rule curbed the effects of McCandless as precedent al-
though it did not expressly reject the rule. 
In Giles Industries v. United States!" the Court of Claims 
exact proportion to stockholdings and no dividends were paid. The lack of dividends was 
not given overriding significance in the reasonableness determination and the bonU8es 
paid in proportion to the stockholdings were given equal emphasis. 1d. at 361-62. 
38. Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M.(CCH) 837,842 (1971), aff'd 503 F.2d 
359 (9th Cir. 1974). 
39. 30 T.C.M.(CCH) at 841. 
40. 503 F.2d at 361. 
41. See supra note 22, Nor-Cal. However, in the Elliots case, the commissioner 
presented the proposition that because Elliot was the sole shareholder, there could be no 
arms-length agreement regarding a percentage of profits bonU8. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 810. 
This same argument was put forth on appeal. Brief for Appellee at 26, 716 F.2d 1241. 
Additionally, the McCandless case was used for the proposition that the lack of divi-
dends is strong evidence of disguised dividends. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 810. On appeal, this 
assertion was still made by the commissioner. Brief for Appellee at 28, 716 F.2d 1241. 
The commissioner contended that at least 15% of the earnings and profits must be dis-
guised dividends,based on the McCandless formula. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 810. The 15% 
estimate was dropped on appeal. These three contentions can be made without analyzing 
the facts of a case beyond noticing that the corporation has a sole-shareholder employee 
paid on a contingent basis and that no dividends are paid. 
42. "Bonuses had been paid to taxpayer's officer-shareholders in every year of its 
existence through the year in question. From the time appellant was originally incorpo-
rated to the filing of this action, Nor-Cal has neither formally declared nor paid a divi-
dend to any of its shaIeholders." 1d. The avoidance of a citation to McCandless could 
have been premised on the fact that because the bonuses were so obviously tied to the 
proportion of stockholdings, the court had no need to formally address the lack of divi-
dends in the McCandless sense. 
43. 501 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1974). In Edwins, two fifty-percent officer-shareholders 
each received a twenty percent bonus from net income before taxes. 1d. at 676. 
44. 1d. at 677 n.5. The court did not directly reject McCandless by name. 1d. at 678. 
45. 496 F.2d 556 (Ct.CI. 1974). In Giles, the two fifty-percent employee-shareholders 
11
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modified its subsequent application of the McCandless holding 
and exmphasized that in order to apply the automatic dividend 
rule, the facts must parallel those in McCandless."8 The court 
went so far as to outline specific factors necessary for the appli-
cation of the automatic dividend rule."7 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In rejecting the McCandless automatic dividend rule, the 
Ninth Circuit dismissed the government's argument that be-
cause the profitable corporation had never paid a dividend to 
the shareholder-officer, part of the compensation must be con-
sidered a disguised dividend. 
The court rejected McCandless for three major reasons. 
First, there is no statute which requires profitable corporations 
to pay dividends.48 This is an acknowledgment that the distribu-
tion of dividends is not mandatory and that Congress intended 
that excessive profits accumulated under such circumstances are 
to be dealt with via the accumulated earnings tax."9 
received compensation equal to fifty percent of the net profits before taxes. 
46. [d. at 567-68. See Coggin, The Status of the McCandless Doctrine, 55 TAXES 
720 (1976). 
47. 496 F.2d at 567-68. As presented by one commentator: 
These distinguishing factors may be briefly summarized as 
follows: 
1. The presence of dividend payments in any year; 
2. Certain of the stockholders are not in fact officers of the 
corporation; 
3. Compensation paid to the stockholder-officers is not propor-
tional to their respective stockholdings. 
4. Divergence in the shareholdings between the officer-share-
holders and; 
5. Compensation paid to stockholder-officers amount to less 
than 50% of the corporation's net profits (before their com-
pensation and federal income tax). 
Coggin, supra note 46 at 731. 
48. 716 F.2d at 1244. 
49. 26 I.R.C. § 531-37 (West 1978). 
532(a) General rule- The accumulated earnings tax imposed 
by section 531 shall apply to every corporation (other than 
th08e described in subsection (b)) formed or availed of for the 
purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its share-
holders or the shareholders of any other corporation by per-
mitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being di-
vided or distributed. [d. at 532(a). 533(a)- Unreasonable 
accumulation determinative of purpose- For purposes of sec-
tion 532, the fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation 
12
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Secondly, the court labeled the premise that the sharehold-
ers of a profitable corporation will demand dividends to be 
faulty. The court noted that a corporation has the right to rein-
vest profits if shareholders prefer to realize investment returns 
through appreciation. 50 
Lastly, the court stated that it may be in the best interest of 
a closely held corporation to maintain a conservative dividend 
policy because retention and reinvestment may be the most rea-
sonable source of financing and credit due to limited access to 
capital.5l 
Next, the court addressed application of the two prong anal-
ysis of reasonableness and compensatory purpose. 52 The court 
explained that where the evidence shows a failure to pay a divi-
dend, but no other evidence of intent to hide dividends in com-
pensation, the focus of the inquiry will be limited to reasonable-
ness under the first prong.53 Such an inquiry can be based on an 
objective standard by examining salaries paid for comparable 
positions in similar corporations.1!4 
The court acknowledged the difficulty of establishing proof 
of intent for the second prong. A subjective analysis is required 
to determine whether there was a compensatory purpose. To cir-
are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of 
the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the 
income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corpora-
tion by the preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the 
contrary. 
[d. at 533(a). 
50. 716 F.2d at 1244. It is interesting to note that under the McCandless doctrine, 
profit reflects the ability to pay a dividend and the lack oC one indicates a disguised 
distribution. However, from a different perspective, profit can be viewed as a positive 
factor in showing that the compensation scheme has not depleted the capital to the point 
where no dividend could be paid. This perspective will still closely scrutinize compensa-
tion that appears to be depleting all the profits at a tax advantage. See Nor-Cal, 503 
F.2d 359. This divergence in approach and reasoning is based in a difference in assump-
tions as to what an independent investor would consider to be reasonable. The McCand-
less doctrine concludes that all investors want the maximum dividends payable. The 
instant opinion reflects a more flexible approach which takes into account the need Cor a 
small business to reserve capital as well as produce sufficient earnings on equity. See 
Note, supra note 31. 
51. 716 F.2d at 1244. See Walthall, supra note 31. 
52. 716 F.2d at 1244. See supra note 18. 
53. 716 F.2d at 1244. 
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1). See supra note 32. 
13
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cumvent this difficulty, the court declared that intent can be in-
ferred if the amount is first determined to be reasonable under 
the first prong.1I1I The court noted that, to a great extent, this 
approach avoids scrutiny of subjective intent. 
The court noted that by allowing the first prong of the te.st 
to subsume the second prong, the analysis will scrutinize com-
pensatory intent secondarily and only if there is evidence that 
an otherwise reasonable amount contains a disguised dividend. 
Such evidence will be the exception and' not the rule.1I8 
The court stated that the analysis of whether the compensa-
tion was reasonable should be considered from the perspective 
of an independent investor.1I7 The question is whether such an 
investor would be willing to compensate the employee in like 
fashion. The factors to be considered were the nature and qual-
ity of the services and the effect of the services on the investor's 
return and the corporation's profits. liS 
Under the Elliots analysis, the employee's role as share-
holder and the nonpayment of dividends are to be viewed as 
only two of the many factors to be considered in evaluating the 
reasonableness of compensation. The court recognized the diffi-
culty inherent in distinguishing between dividends and the com-
pensation received by employee-shareholders of a closely held 
corporation due to the lack of "arms-length" dealing.1I9 Because 
55. 716 F.2d at 1243. 
56. See Nor-Cal, 503 F.2d 359. See also Klamath Med. Servo Bureau, 261 F.2d 842. 
The Ninth Circuit's approach gives equal weight to all factors which contribute to the 
reasonableness analysis and completely rejects the automatic dividend rule which exam-
ines compensatory intent first and allows the lack of dividends to overrule even a finding 
of reasonable compensation. Under the court's analysis, any compensation which is 
found to be reasonable will have its compensatory intent inferred with the exception of 
"rare" cases where there is evidence of a disguised dividend. 
57. 716 F.2d at 1247. 
58. [d. at 1245. 
59. Due to the very nature of close corporations, they seem to attract more than 
their fair share of litigation. As one commentator explains: 
As a practical matter, the question of deductibility of 
amounts paid to stockholder-employees only arises in the con-
text of the closely held corporation. There is no statutory au-
thority for a differentiation in tax treatment between the 
closely-held corporation (with only a few stockholders, in 
which all or most of the stockholders serve a8 officers and em-
ployees of the corporation) and the publicly-held corporation 
14
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the sole shareholder-officer would be the sole recipient of divi-
dends, the observation that compensation is in proportion to 
ownership interest is meaningless.60 Other evidence must be pre-
sent to press the examination beyond that of reasonable com-
pensation and into compensatory intent. 
The Elliots court examined the question of whether the 
payments to Elliot were for his role as employee-officer or share-
holder.61 The analysis focused on the reasonableness of compen-
sation payments as a whole under all the factors and circum-
stances.62 The court organized the inquiry into five broad 
(with its stock traded over the counter or on one of the na-
tional or regional exchanges). However, salary and bonus pay-
ments to stockholder-employees of closely held corporations 
are said to be subject to special scrutiny because of the lack of 
an "arms-length" relationship between the employee and his 
corporate employer. Harolds Club v. Comm'r, 340 F.2d 861 
(9th Cir. 1965). In reality, it is reasonable to believe that chief 
executive officers of a large publicly-held corporation, whose 
stock is widely distributed among a large number of investors, 
with no single dominant stockholder or group of stockholders, 
do not bargain at "arms-length" for their compensation. In 
such a situation, it is generally recognized that management is 
in control of the proxy machinery which elects the board of 
directors, and thus is nominally subservient to the directors so 
elected. 
See A. BERLE AND G. MEANS. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 66-69 
(rev. ed. 1967); Walthall, supra note 31 at 1 n.1. 
60. All payments to a sole shareholder are in proportion to his stockholdings. There-
fore, the use of compensation payments which are in proportion to stock ownership as 
part of the test for hidden dividends would always be indicative of di,sguised dividends 
wher~ none had been distributed. Prior to the Elliots decision, that factor was used in 
conjunction with a lack of dividends as an indicator on noncompensatory intent. See 
Schneider, 500 F.2d at 153, and Pacific Grains, 399 F.2d at 605-606. The Ninth Circuit's 
opinion in Elliots has removed a troublesome step from the reasonableness analysis. 
61. See note 29 supra. The question in Elliots as to whether the payments were for 
the role of employee-officer or shareholder appears to be another way of asking if the 
payments were dividends or compensation. The underlying assumption is that if the con-
clusion reached is that the payments were for the employee role, they must be compen-
sation. The simple converse of this is that if they are not for the employee role, they 
must therefore be for the shareholder role and thus dividends. The next assumption in 
this approach is that if the payments were for the employee role but were in excess of a 
reasonable amount then the excess must be for the shareholder role and thus dividends. 
This approach avoids the McCandless result where payments which are reasonable could 
be attributed to the shareholder role since it allocates the compensation for the employee 
role first and the excess to the shareholder. 
62. An objective viewpoint is taken in this analysis. This alleviates the scrutiny of 
subjective intent as a primary focus unless evidence points to a specific intent. Even the 
assumption that payments in excess of what is reasonable for the employee role should 
be considered as payments to the shareholder role may be modified in light of some 
15
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categories of factors that were to be given equal weight. 
The first category was the employee's role in the company.6S 
The court noted that the Tax Court's findings that Elliot 
worked 80 hours per week to be an "appropriate considera-
tion."6. However, the court questioned the Tax Court's charac-
terization of Elliot's qualifications as a "capable executive" with 
"no special expertise."611 After examining the record, the court 
pointed out that the Tax Court should reconsider Elliot's "ex-
treme personal dedication and devotion to his work" and to 
what extent an independent investor would be willing to com-
pensate him.66 
The second category, which the court labeled "external 
compensation" was the comparison of the employee's salary to 
salaries paid by similar companies for like services. The court 
condoned the Tax Court's comparison of Elliot's compensation 
to that of managers at other John Deere dealers.67 The compari-
factors or circumstances such as the economy or the fluctuations of contingent salaries. 
716 F.2d at 1246-48. 
63. The court relied on American Foundry v. Comm'r, 536 F.2d 289, 291-292 (9th 
Cir. 1976). The court looked at the position held, the hours worked, the duties performed 
and the general importance of the employee to the success of the company. 716 F.2d at 
1245. 
64. 716 F.2d at 1245-46. 
65. 1d. at 1246. Elliot had a degree in Political Science and ran his own company, 
yet the Tax Court felt there was nothing in the record demonstrating any special exper-
tise. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 813. 
66. 716 F.2d at 1246. The viewpoint of the independent investor avoids the difficult 
subjective analysis of the compensatory intent test. A similar analysis was used in Carole 
Accessories v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M.(CCH) 285 (1973)(citing Hecht v. United States, 54 
F.2d 968 (Ct.CI. 1932)). The case referred to the "unrelated employer." 32 T.C.M.(CCH) 
at 1289. 
67. The relative size of the concerns being compared should also be taken into con-
sideration. A salary will be found reasonable as long as "[ilt compares favorably with 
salaries shown to have been paid that year to heads of kindred industrial concerns whose 
total earnings were much greater." Hoffman Radio Corp. v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 264, 266 
(9th Cir. 1949). When a comparison is made to another company for the purpose of 
determining reasonableness, it is important to compare the profits and not the gross 
sales. The Ninth Circuit addressed this point in Wagner and Son, Inc. v. Comm'r, 93 
F.2d 816 (1937) when they stated: 
1d. at 819. 
Petitioner introduced no evidence to show the salaries paid by 
other concerns in similar circumstances. Although petitioner 
shows the amount of its sales for the years prior to 1929, it 
does not show the amount of profit for those years. Obviously, 
a large amount of sales does not alone justify a particular sal-
ary, for those sales may have been at a figure below cost. 
16
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son was made on the basis of the multiple serVIces that Elliot 
had provided to the company.66 
The third category involved the character and condition of 
the company. This focused on the company's size as indicated 
by its sales, net income and capital value69 as well as the com-
plexities of the business and the general economic conditions.70 
The court agreed with the Tax Court's consideration of these 
68. Elliot did the work of two or three persons at other John Deere dealers and so 
the appropriate comparison was to multiple salaries. 716 F.2d at 1246. See supra note 5. 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3). 
69. In General Water Heater Corp. v. Comm'r, 42 F.2d 419 (1930), the Ninth Circuit 
looked at the ability to pay dividends as negating the inference created by no dividends 
actually being paid. "It is contended that it was reasonable to pay these salaries because 
after their payment there was left sufficient income to pay 7.5 per cent. [sic] on the 
invested capital for the year 1921, and 9.6 per cent. [sic] for the year 1922." [d. at 420. 
Yet the requirement that a certain amount exist for potential distribution as a dividend 
is not far removed from the requirement that the dividends actually be distributed be-
cause the policy still invades the realm that should be reserved as a business decision. 
The evaluation of the appropriate rate of return on an investment and the timing of 
withdrawal of profits from a corporation are both business decisions. See O'Neill, supra 
note 29, at 84. If the existence of dividends becomes a focus instead of a factor, then not 
only does the payment of a dividend come into consideration but the amount of the 
dividend would be open to scrutiny. Widespread use of the doctrine would shift the prin-
cipal focus of reasonable compensation disputes away from an evaluation of amounts 
paid and services performed to an examination of the return on equity capital. Instead of 
evaluating the payments in relation to the work performed by the employees, courts 
would be evaluating the payments in terms of the return that these employees are enti-
tled to as shareholders. Besides being a further digression from the Code provisions, this 
would impose an additional burden on the owners of closely held corporations. Invest-
ment decisions in a free society are made for a myriad of reasons, and the anticipated 
and actual return on such investments varies concomitantly. The McCandless doctrine 
penalizes the shareholder investor for any decision which deviate from the norm estab-
lished by the court. This interference by the judiciary would result in rigidities pertinent 
to only one business form, thus reducing the value to society of the closely-held corpora-
tion. Vondran, Updating the McCandless Doctrine: Taxing of Reasonable Compensa-
tion Paid by Closely-Held Corporations, 12 J. MAR. L. PRAC. & PROC. 113, 132 (1978). 
70. Since the amounts paid under contingent compensation may be calculated based 
on profits and profits are affected by economic conditions, such fluctuations have been 
considered by the courts as a relevant factor. 
On the factual side, there is no denying that petitioner's situa-
tion had by 1943 ch"nged radically because of the unantici-
pated advent of the war. The Court found that the unusually 
large amount of business done that year was attributable in 
the main, not to services rendered by Hoffman, but to war 
conditions making for abnormal earnings. 
Hoffman, 177 F.2d at 266. Another example of a condition that will affect earnings of a 
number of industries is a fluctuating market price. "External conditions, specifically the 
Russian wheat sale, resulted in a high market price for grain during part of the period at 
issue." M & K Farms, Inc. v. United States, 556 F. Supp. 50, 51 (D. Montana, 1982). 
17
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factors and did not engage in any further analysis.71 
The fourth category focused on factors which indicate con-
flict of interest.72 The court reasoned that where a relationship78 
exists between the corporationH and the employee which would 
permit the disguise of dividends as compensation, a close exami-
nation of the situation is warranted. The court reiterated that 
the compensation should be examined from the perspective of 
the hypothetical independent shareholder who would be con-
cerned with the amount of profits that would be left after the 
compensation was paid.711 As long as a reasonable return was 
71. 716 F.2d at 1246. The Tax Court considered numerous charts detailing data per-
taining to other John Deere dealers but comparison was difficult because the other deal-
erships serviced different sized territories and only two others sold both agricultural and 
industrial equipment as Elliots Inc. did. The Tax Court did address the effect of eco-
nomic conditions: 
Also, we have noted that, compared with other years, all John 
Deere agricultural dealers in the area in which petitioner oper-
ated with sales volume comparable to petitioner's had higher 
profits than in any other year for which we have statistics, in-
dicating that economic conditions substantially contributed to 
the profitability of sales of agricultural equipment in that 
year. 
40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 813. The basic assumption is that the officer-employees role contrib-
utes to the profitability of the corporation and to his own compensation if it is based on 
a contingent formula tied to profits. However, if the profits are viewed as a result of a 
windfall due to economic conditions, the role of the officer-employee is nullified. It seems 
illogical to attribute the profits to one simple factor or the other. During poor economic 
times, any profit made may be due to the relative diligence and genius of the employee. 
On the other hand, during periods of economic growth, a company that does poorly may 
blame management. The better view would seem to be that profits are affected by nu-
merous economic and personnel factors and the analysis should be conducted on both 
levels. 
72. Under the facts of the Elliots case, this part of the court's analysis was critical in 
undermining the logic behind the McCandless rule. 
73. One such relationship is where, as in the instant case, the employee is the sole-
shareholder. Another very common relationship if familial. "The Board of Directors au-
thorizing the bonuses was comprised of Rodgers, his wife, and an attorney with only the 
first two participating at the time of authorization." Pacific Grains, 399 F.2d at 605. It is 
in situations like this that the Ninth Circuit's "independent investor" analysis lends an 
objective viewpoint to a very subjective situation. 716 F.2d at 1245. 
74. A closely-held corporation can be defined fiS "one in which both the manage-
ment and ownership are to a substantial degree vested in a small group of persons, and 
in which there is a high frequency of overlapping of the roles of shareholder, director, 
and officer by these persons or members of their immediate families." Vondran, supra 
note 69, at 116. 
75. The assumption is that an "independent investor" would be flexible in approach 
to each situation but would want to protect investments in a reasonable fashion. Com-
pensation schemes which leave no profits may lead to an inference of a disguised divi-
dend if an "independent investor" would object under the circumstances. An example of 
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available to the investor, the court concluded that it is a good 
indicator that the compensation is not a disguised dividend. The 
court stated that the corporation's 20% rate of return indicated 
that the corporation and Elliot were not exploiting their 
relationship.76 
The court looked at one more set of factors in determining 
whether the payments were attributable to Elliot's role as an 
employee or as a shareholder. The fifth category looked at in-
consistencies in the corporation's payments to employees. The 
court reasoned that existence of a "reasonable, longstanding, 
consistently applied compensation plan" is evidence of reasona-
ble compensation.77 In the instant case, the annual bonus was 
paid according to a predetermined formula of fifty-percent of 
net profits over a period of twenty years.78 The court stressed 
that the reasonableness of contingent payments is to be based 
on the reasonableness of the formula itself.79 
The court stated that the Tax Court erred by concentrating 
8uch a plan is found in Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Comm'r, 84 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1936): 
"Petitioner also contends that there was a mutual agreement contract (implied perhaps) 
between the members and petitioner whereby the members were to receive all the net 
profits; that because of such agreement there could be no moneys belonging to petitioner, 
and therefore petitioner would have no profits." Id. at 455. An independent investor 
might not find this to be a reasonable way to nurture an investment. 
76. The Tax Court had limited its findings to the connection between the sole share-
holder and the lack of dividends. The Ninth Circuit characterized these findings as rele-
vant factors but pointed out that those two factors can't be used in isolation and that 
any such situation requires further examination. 716 F.2d at 1246-47. 
77. Id. at 1247-48. "Bonuses to employees will constitute allowable deductions from 
gross income when such payments are made in good faith and as additional compensa-
tion for the services actually rendered by the employees, provided such payments, when 
added to the stipulated salaries, do not exceed a reasonable compensation for the ser-
vices rendered." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-9 T.D. 6500, 1983-15 C.B. 658. 
78. It should be noted that the bonuses were not paid exclusively to Elliot. "All of 
the employees of petitioner participated to some extent in these bonuses, the amount 
being determined by a vote of the board of directors and not by a present [sic) formula 
a8 was the case of the bonus to Mr. Elliot." 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 805. That the bonuses 
were not made exclusively to officer-shareholders negates one of the factors the Ninth 
Circuit considered in Nor-Cal to determine that the compensation was not purely for 
services. 503 F.2d at 362. See supra note 19. 
79. 716 F.2d at 1248. In Schanchrist Foods, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M.(P-H) 559 
(1977), the Tax Court found that the formula used was a good faith attempt to arrive at 
a reasonable level of compensation. The base salary was $30,000 and 4 % of invested 
capital retained for future growth. The first $10,000 net profits yielded 50 %, the next 
$10,000 yielded 40%, the third $10,000, 30% and 10% of the remaining profits were 
added in. [d. at 563-64. 
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on the amounts paid under the formula for the two years in 
question and not on the reasonableness of the formula.so The 
formula in the instant case had over-compensated in some years 
and undercompensated in others yet the court felt such fluctua-
tions should not make the formula unreasonables1 if it has been 
reasonable in the long run.S2 The court directed that the view-
point should be that of an independent investor who would look 
for a formula which allowed a satisfactory return on equity over 
the long run. S3 
80. 716 F.2d at 1248. 
81. As one commentator put it, "[t)he reasonable salary test need not be met on an 
annual basis but only over the whole period of employment." Ford and Page, Reasonable 
Compensation: Continuous Controversy, 5 J. CORP. TAX'N 307, 315 (1979). 
82. A comparison of the compensation actually paid to Elliot with that stated to 
reasonable by the Tax Court shows the actual average compensation to be less than the 
figure determined by the Tax Court to be a reasonable average annual income. 
Fiscal Year Consumer Compensation Reasonable 
Ending Price Index Paid Mr. Compensation 
February 28 (1967 = 100.0) Elliot Under Tax 
Court Decision Difference 
1968 100.00" $ 42,800 $ 81,246 $ (38,446) 
1969 104.2 19,600 84,658 (65,058 [sic) 
1970 109.8 34,035 89,208 (55,173) 
1971 116.3 84,450 94,489 (10,039) 
1972 121.3 68,323 98,551 (30,228) 
1973 125.3 66,401 101,801 (35,400) 
1974 133.1 136,536 108,138 28,398 
1975 147.7 181,074 120,000 61,074 
1976 161.2 193,663[sic] 130,9684 62,695 
1977 170.5 153,696 138,524 15,172 
1978 185.0 83,052 150,305 (67,253) 
Total $1,063,630 $1,197,888 $(134,258) 
Average $ 96,694 $ 108,899 $( 12,205)" 
• The Consumer Price Index for the calendar year ending immediately prior to the end 
of the respective fiscal year is used because the fiscal year ends only two months after 
the close of the calendar year. 
4 The increase in compensation determined by the Tax Court for the year ending Febru-
ary, 1975 was less than the increase in the Consumer Price Index. 
" The comparison would not be significantly different if the amount of $125,000 for the 
year ending February 28, 1976 was used as the base. Using the 1976 figure, the annual 
average for Reasonable Compensation Under Tax Court Decision would be $103,936 or 
$7,205 more than the average compensation paid to Mr. Elliot. 
Brief for Appellant at 7, Elliots, 40 T.C.M.(CCH) 802. The chart utilizes $120,000 for the 
fiscal year ending February 28, 1975 as determined by the Tax Court to be reasonable 
compensation. The figures represent what would have been reasonable under the Tax 
Court decision with adjustment for changes in the Consumer Price Index. Id. 
83. 716 F.2d at 1248. 
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A formula, according to the court, should compensate for 
the work done, the performance achieved, the responsibility as-
sumed and the experience and dedication of the employee.s• The 
court noted that any implication on the part of the Tax Court 
that incentive payment plans for shareholder-employees are un-
reasonable was e~roneous.SIi The court expressed approval of 
such plans and their tendency to encourage extra effort and ded-
ication which in turn contributes to the overall success of the 
corporation.ss The court stressed that the mere fact that an em-
ployee is also a shareholder does not make the plan unreasona-
ble as long as an independent investor would approve.S7 
84.Id. 
85. Id. The Tax Court had relied on the Schneider case for the rejection of incen-
tive-bonus plans. The Schneider court focused on the lack of arms-length bargaining 
which it considered to be precluded by the fact that the employee was the sole share-
holder. "No special incentive was necessary to insure his best efforts for he would receive 
the fruits of success through his status as the majority shareholder .... " 40 
T.C.M.(CCH) at 811 (quoting Schneider, 500 F.2d at 153). The Tax Court, in Elliots, 
rejected the significance of a longstanding formula to determine the compensation of a 
sole shareholder and quoted Schneider. Schneider is distinguishable from Elliots due to 
the nature of the agreements. Two percent of the net sales were set aside for taxes and 
then the net profits were equally divided by the officer-shareholders. This system never 
left any amount to be paid as a dividend and thereby precluded any payment of divi-
dends. Although no dividends were paid, the Elliots formula allowed the payment of 
dividends, if desired, since the bonus only incorporated 50% of the net profits. But see 
supra note 72. 
86.Id. 
87. Id. The court's conclusion is supported by the language of Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
7(b)(2): 
The form or method of fixing compensation is not decisive 
as to deductibility. While any form of contingent compensa-
tion invites scrutiny as a possible distribution of earnings of 
the enterprise, it does not follow that payments on a conthi-
gent basis are to be treated fundamentally on any basis differ-
ent from that applying to compensation at a flat rate. Gener-
ally speaking, if contingent compensation is paid pursuant to a 
free bargain made before the services are rendered, not influ-
enced by any other consideration on the part of the employer 
other than that of securing on fair and advantageous terms the 
services of the individual, it should be allowed as a deduction 
even though in the actual working out of the contract it may 
prove to be great~r than the amount which would ordinarily 
be paid. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2). The application of this part of the statute becomes especially 
significant when there is a sole shareholder such as Elliot involved. The statute approves 
the use of contingent compensation but cautions that it should be "pursuant to a free 
bargain." This causes difficulty in a closely-held corporation since it is inherently diffi-
cult to prove that the agreement was reached on objective grounds. The Ninth Circuit's 
use of the "independent investor" becomes critical in reaching the threshold determina-
tion of whether the method of fixing compensation and the resulting formula (in contin-
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IV. CRITIQUE 
In holding that no conclusive presumption of a disguised 
dividend arises from the bare fact that a profitable corporation 
does not pay dividends, the Ninth Circuit followed the tenor of 
Treasury Regulation section 1.162-7. The regulation states that 
"the compensation may not exceed what is reasonable under all 
the circumstances."88 The court decided correctly that no one 
factor is decisive in the determination of reasonableness.89 
Apparently the Internal Revenue Service recognized the 
same reasoning in 1979 when they re-evaluated automatic in-
dicators of disguised dividends.90 Revenue Ruling 79-8 backed 
away from the application of an automatic dividend rule in an 
employee-shareholder lack of dividend situation, but character-
ized the lack of dividends as a "very significant factor."91 How-
ever, the ruling disallows a lack of dividends as the sole ground 
for rejection of a deduction if the compensation is otherwise rea-
sonable and is paid for services actually rendered.92 
Despite the language of the Treasury Regulations, Revenue 
Ruling 79-8 and case law which emphasizes the factual nature93 
of the reasonable compensation inquiry, the government at-
tempted to utilize McCandless-type reasoning in both their Tax 
Court and Ninth Circuit arguments in ElliotS. 94 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's unequivocal rejection of McCandless should return the 
analysis of reasonable compensation back to that of "reasonable-
gent compensation situations) was reasonable. 
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.l62.7(b)(3). See supra note 16. 
89. 716 F.2d at 1248. 
90. Rev. Rul. 79-8 C.B. 92. 
91. Id. at 93. 
92. Id. 
93. See supra note 21. 
94. See supra note 35. This approach diverges from the weighing of facts and infer-
ences prescribed by the Mayson and Irby cases. See supra note 21. Most alarming is the 
attempted use of the 15% figure as an automatic calculation. The corporation in Mc-
Candless was in the business of ceramic tile contracting and the years questioned were 
1963-65. Elliots Inc. was in the business of selling and servicing John Deere equipment 
and was questioned regarding the years of 1975 and 1976. The 15% figure in McCandless 
has been criticized because the basis for it was never articulated by the court. There was 
no justification for choosing that particular percentage and it would seem unwise to pro-
mote its future arbitrary application. It was probably this attempt to lift the percentage 
out of the factual context of McCandless and apply it automatically to the Elliots facts 
which prompted the Ninth Circuit to clarify this matter once and for all by rejecting the 
automatic dividend rule. 
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ness" and should ease the job of tax planners, at least in the 
Ninth Circuit.911 The loss of "lack of dividends" as a trigger for 
disguised dividends will no doubt have an effect upon the scru-
tiny given the tax returns of sole shareholder-employees by the 
Internal Revenue Service.96 
The decision to reject McCandless was primarily based on 
the fact that no statute requires dividends to be paid by profita-
ble corporations.97 The court noted that the accumulated earn-
ings tax9S was intended to handle such abuses. This blanket 
statement only clouds the issue instead of clarifying it. 
It is true that the accumulated earnings tax comes into ef-
fect when a corporation allows profits to accumulate beyond its 
reasonable needs. However, the inference that has created the 
specific problem addressed in Elliots is not based on abuse due 
to profits being allowed to accumulate. The inference is that 
profits are not being paid as dividends nor accumulated because 
they are being siphoned-off via the mechanism of disguised divi-
dends in compensation. The problem is one of under-accumula-
tion. The accumulated earnings tax cannot handle this abuse be-
cause there will be no accumulation to trigger its provisions. 
The focus should be on what is a reasonable amount of 
profit for a corporation to retain, not on how the profits which 
are not retained are utilized. Profits can be visualized on a spec-
trum, with a reasonable amount of profit retention in the middle 
95. See Walthall, supra note 31 at 1. 
96. [d. at 3. 
Id. at 3 n.6. 
[O)nly a small minority of professional decisions concerning 
the deductibility of compensation and the adequacy for tax 
purposes of dividend distributions are made by courts in liti-
gated cases. The majority of such decisions are made, in the 
first instance, by lawyers and accountants consulting with 
their clients in the business planning process. Even when the 
Internal Revenue Service disputes the propriety of a portion 
of the compensation payments or the adequacy of dividends, 
the issues, in the overwhelming majority of cases, are settled 
by negotiation. The decided cases, numerous as they may be, 
reveal only the tip of the iceberg. 
97. 716 F.2d at 1244. The rejection was also based on the fact that no law precluded 
the reinvestment of dividends and that such activity may be in the best interest of the 
corporation. 
98. See supra note 49. 
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and over-accumulation and under-accumulation on each end. 
Accumulated earnings are statutorily penalized once they sur-
pass a certain dollar amount on the profit spectrum. The statute 
qualifies the demarcation between reasonable retention and 
over-accumulation by allowing accumulations beyond a certain 
dollar amount only if they are being held to meet the corpora-
tion's "reasonable needs." Therefore, the over-accumulation end 
of the spectrum is ultimately limited by an analysis of the pur-
pose for which the profits are being accumulated. 
The confusion seems to center around the under-accumula-
tion end of the profit spectrum. There is no statute to set a min-
imum dollar amount for retained earnings nor is there a qualifi-
cation that less than that amount can be retained if there are 
"reasonable needs." The focus is usually on how much profit 
needs to be retained to insure viability and stability of the cor-
poration.99 There is an inference that if less than this amount is 
retained, the security of the corporation may be jeopardized.loo 
99. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 140 (1972), reh'g denied 409 U.S. 898 
(1972). 
Even where there are corporate earnings, the legal power 
to declare dividends is vested solely in the corporate board. In 
making decisions with respect to dividends, the board must 
consider a number of factors. It must balance the expectation 
of stockholders to reasonable dividends when earned against 
corporate needs for retention of earnings. The first responsi-
bility of the board is to safeguard corporate financial viability 
for the long term. This means, among other things, the reten-
tion of sufficient earnings to assure adequate working capital 
as well as resources for retirement of debt, for replacement 
and modernization of plant and equipment, and for growth 
and expansion. The nature of a corporation's business, as well 
as the policies and long-range plans of management, are also 
relevant to dividend payment decisions. 
408 U.S. at 140. 
[d. 
100. In Byrum, the court stated: 
The spectrum of types of corporate businesses, and of 
permissible policies with respect to the retention of earnings, 
is broad indeed. It ranges from the public utility with rela-
tively assured and stable income to the new and speculative 
corporation engaged in a cylical business or organized to ex-
ploit a new patent or unproved technology. Some corporations 
pay no dividends at all, as they are organized merely to hold 
static assets for prolonged periods (e.g., land, mineral re-
sources, and the like). Corporations which emphasize growth 
tend to lower dividend payments, whereas mature corpora-
tions may pursue generous dividend policies. 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/10
1985) TAX LAW 195 
To go below this level would require the qualification of "good 
sound business reasons. "101 
It can be reasoned, by analogy, that just as profits in excess 
of those retained for "reasonable needs" can trigger the accumu-
lated earnings tax, profits below the amount required for "good 
sound business reasons" should trigger the label of "siphoned-off 
profits." This approach focuses on the relative amounts retained 
and the purpose for retention. The spectrum between 
"siphoned-off profits" and accumulated profits is a matter of 
degree. 
Dividends are specific amounts of profit which are not re-
tained. If a distribution of profits to shareholders is not made, 
dividends should not be visualized as hovering within the accu-
mulated profits, waiting to be distributed. If they are not de-
clared, they do not exist. 102 A lack of dividends cannot trigger 
the concept of "siphoned-off profits" because that mechanism is 
based on an insufficient retention of profits and if a dividend is 
not declared it does not reduce the degree of profits retained. 
However, compensation does reduce the degree of profits re-
tained. By analogy, the reduction in retained profits can be justi-
fied by "good sound business reasons" as long as the compensa-
tion meets the statutory requirements of section 162.103 If the 
amount is found to be unreasonable, it is not justified by "good 
sound business reasons" and triggers the label of "siphoned-off 
profits." Accordingly, a disguised dividend is profit that, instead 
of being distributed as a dividend, which could qualify as a 
"good sound business reason," is "siphoned-off" under a com-
101. Capitol Markets, Ltd. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 376, 381 (D. Hawaii 1962). 
The court stated that "there were good sound business reasons for this [funds retained 
for expansion of the business], including the necessity to make payments on mortgages 
and obligations of the company incurred in connection with new investments, and the 
investment of earnings during a period of community growth justifying such action." [d. 
102. The exception to this would be when evidence indicates that the compensation 
in its entirety was not paid for services rendered. Then the dividends can be visualized 
as "hovering" within the compensation as disguised dividend. Notice, however, that this 
approach still does not search for the hidden dividend within the accumulated profits 
and therefore avoids the idea that dividends are mandatory and that if none are distrib-
uted, they must be hidden somewhere. The assumption is that if they are hidden, it is in 
the compensation. However, a second assumption should be that if they are hidden in 
the compensation, they are only hidden in the part that is in excess of "reasonable." 
103. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 1978). See supra note 15. 
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pensation label. This false labeling of the dividend as compensa-
tion, in order to gain tax advantages, is the evil which should be 
avoided, not the lack of profits distributed as dividends. 
The court cited Casey v. Commissioner and Laure v. Com-
missionerlO' to support its conclusion that the lack of statutory 
authority is an indication that Congress purposely avoided re-
quiring dividends to be distributed. Additionally, the court notes 
that there is no law precluding the reinvestment of corporate 
profits. 1011 
The third justification for the rejection of McCandless was 
that retention and reinvestment may be in the best interest of 
the corporation. The court relied on United States v. Byrum 
which noted the limited access of close corporations to capital 
markets. lOS The court's acknowledgment of the special economic 
104. 716 F.2d at 1244. Casey v. Comm'r, 267 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1959); Laure v. 
Comm'r, 70 T.C. 1087 (1978). Neither case was Ninth Circuit precedent. The Second 
Circuit stated: 
We think that the 1954 enactments indicate that Congress 
did not want the taxing authorities to be second-guessing the 
responsible managers of corporations as to what extent profits 
should be distributed or retained, unless the taxing authorities 
were in a position to prove that their position was correct. 
267 F.2d at 30. The Tax Court in Laure stated that they "doubt that section 162(a)(1) 
was intended to permit the Commissioner or the courts to sit in judgment over whether 
dividends should be paid in lieu of reasonable compensation to employee-shareholders." 
70 T.C. at 1098. 
105. 716 F.2d at 1244. However, as noted previously, the court recognized that al-
though the retention of profits is not precluded, it may be limited by the accumulated 
earnings tax. I.R.C. § 531-37 (West 1978). The court's viewpoint reflected the reasoning 
of the following passage which was cited in the opinion: 
The automatic dividend rule, as well as being unsup-
ported by legal analysis, rests on inadequate economic analy-
sis. The court's perception of the requirement of a return to 
shareholders is unsatisfactory because it fails to assess ade-
quately the following factors: (1) the concept of the return to a 
shareholder should not be limited to current dividend payout, 
but should include the potential of future return or apprecia-
tion; (2) the shareholder employee expects a return for ser-
vices 8S well as a return to capital, and will seek to maximize 
the total return; and (3) if a corporation is not unprofitable in 
the sense that it fails to generate a sufficient return for both 
the shareholder and employee functions, it does not follow 
that the shareholder's function should be fully compensated, 
thus allocating the "short-fall" entirely to employee function . 
. Note, supra note 31, at 450 (cited 716 F.2d at 1244). 
106. 408 U.S. 125. The Supreme Court reasoned that "directors of a closely held 
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character of close corporations parallels the trend of greater flex-
ibility in corporation statutes designed to promote close corpora-
tions. Such changes are reflected in the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act and corporation statutes of a growing number of 
states.107 The close corporation, although traditionally handled 
under the same statutes as publicly held corporations, has differ-
ent economic characteristics which are often met by special ar-
rangements in the usual corporate model. By analogy, federal 
tax policy should be responsive to the economic nature of the 
close corporation. lOB 
In Elliots, the Ninth Circuit sought to establish clear, pre-
dictable guidelines in the area of employee/sole shareholder 
compensation by utilizing the "independent investor" test.109 In 
this area where employee and shareholder roles overlap, it is un-
derstandable that there might be motivation for compensation 
and dividends to overlap. The court's approach eliminates anal-
ysis of the actual motive or intent of the party by evaluating the 
transaction according to the viewpoint of the "independent 
investor." 
The major difficulty in this area is the lack of the arms-
length bargaining prescribed by section 1.162-7(b)(2) of the 
Treasury Regulations.110 Although the problem is most obvious 
in a close corporation, it must be recognized that the paradigm 
arms-length transaction is difficult to find even in publicly held 
small corporation must bear in mind the relatively limited access of such an enterprise to 
capital markets. This may require a more conservative policy with respect to dividends 
than would be expected of an established corporation with securities listed on national 
exchanges." [d. at 140. 
107. See Model Business Corp. Act § 35 (1982). See also Cal. Corp. Code §§ 158. 
202(a) and 300. 
108. A definition of close corporations which reflects the economics of this entity is 
found in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England. 367 Mass. 578 (1975). 
[d. at 585. 
There is no single. generally accepted definition. Some 
commentators emphasize "an integration of ownership and 
management." ... in which the stockholders occupy most 
management positions. Others focus on the number of stock-
holders and the nature of the market for the stock. In this 
view. close corporations have few stockholders; there is little 
market for corporate stock. 
109. This term was suggested in Note. supra note 31. at 450. 
110. See supra note 87. 
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corporations. lll The Ninth Circuit's use of the "independent in-
vestor" provides a test that will eliminate the subjective analysis 
unless the evidence indicates otherwise. 112 
The policy rationale behind an objective approach is impor-
tant to close corporations because sole shareholder's transactions 
are never strictly arms-length in nature. This approach recog-
nizes that the "American dream," made up of small business 
persons who are the epitome of free enterprise, would be under-
mined at its very foundation if the essential relationship of sole 
shareholder-employee is characterized as a negative factor. 113 
111. The officers are on the board of directors which votes for the salaries. See 
supra note 59. 
112. See supra note 60. 
113. In order to determine the appropriate policies for governing corporate entities, 
the question, "what is the typical corporation?" must be answered. During the years in 
question in Elliots, the typical corporation was not a multi-billion dollar, multi-million 
shareholder enterprise: 
The number of active corporations in 1976 has been esti-
mated to be 2,105,000. Statistical Abstract of the United 
States 563 (1979). In terms of dollar asseta ... over 90 per-
cent of U.S. corporations had assets of under a million, or 
stated another way, the proportion of corporate millionaires to 
the total number of corporations was less than one in ten. 
Breaking this down even further, the biggest block of corpora-
tions have assets between $10,000 and $1,000,000 and the me-
dian corporation has assets of slightly under $100,000. A. 
CONRAD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 100, 101 (1976). Thus 
it would appear that in terms of size, corporations are spread 
along an unbroken spectrum, with the greatest concentration 
in numbers at the lower end. 
It is also apparent ... that though corporations with as-
sets of over ten million make up about 1.3 percent of the total 
number of corporations, they also control 87 percent of the 
total assets. 
Another important consideration is the number of inves-
tors. Though there is less information with regard to this than 
other aspects of corporate size, the available data on share-
holders appear to fit the general pattern of corporate statis-
tics. In 1971, General Motors, which ranked first in sales, had 
about 1,360,000 shareholders; Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
ranked second, had 808,000. But over 90 percent of the total 
corporations have ten or fewer shareholders, 1 percent have 
more than one hundred, and fewer than one hundred corpora-
tions have more than one thousand. CONRAD, supra at 119. 
In summary, it is evident that since the greatest concen-
tration of numbers is found in corporations with assets be-
tween $10,000 and $1,000,000 and with less than ten share-
holders, if there were such a thing as the typical American 
corporation, it would certainly not be the corporate giant. 
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The better view is to encourage such relationships and examine 
them from the perspective of the "independent investor." 
The most revolutionary aspect of the court's opinion in-
volved analyzing the contingent compensation formula as the 
test for reasonableness. This approach is supported by Treasury 
Regulation section 1.162-7(b)(2) which states that contingent 
compensation should be allowed, if made pursuant to a free bar-
gain, despite the fact that "in the actual working out of the con-
tract it may prove to be greater than the amount which would 
ordinarily be paid." The court uses the term "formula" to ad-
dress the concept of the original contract between the employer 
and employee. The court's common sense approach recognizes 
that such a contingent compensation formula motivates employ-
ees to work harder. It also enables the court to dispel the myth 
that a shareholder-employee will not be motivated by a bonus 
because he will benefit whether he applies his best effort or not. 
The court concluded that a reasonable, longstanding, con-
sistently applied compensation plan is evidence of reasonable 
compensation.114 This approach takes the reasonableness focus 
away from the amount paid which may fluctuate from year to 
year under a contingent plan. 
Obviously, such fluctuation in amount from year to year is 
an inherent element of contingent compensation. lUI If evidence 
of inconsistent compensation is the traditional test for unreason-
ableness, contingent compensation is suspect by reason of its 
very design. 118 Although this might not be viewed as a problem 
L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON, JR., D. SCHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POLICY, MATERIALS 
AND PROBLEMS 7-8 (1982). 
114. 716 F.2d at 1247. The court stated that inconsistency of past compensation is a 
factor that could be indicative of the payments going "beyond reasonable." 1d. Although 
the court cited no authority for this proposition, such a perspective has been forwarded 
by both the Seventh Circuit and the Tax Court. Six years was seen as a long enough 
period to aid in establishing reasonableness in Edwina, 501 F.2d 675. See Madison Silo 
Co. v. Comm'r, 11 T.C.M.(CCH) 82, 86 (1952); Osborne Motors v. Comm'r, 35 
T.C.M.(CCH) 691, 693 (1976). 
115. "If the principal of bonus compensation is to be recognized, it carries with it 
the payment of liberal compensation in good years and moderate compensation in lean 
years." Roth Office 'Equipment Co. v. Gallagher, 172 F.2d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1949). 
116. Rapid increases in compensation should be avoided absent strong 
proof that there has been a corresponding increase in the du-
ties and responsibilities of the executives. The natural ten-
dency of the IRS is to regard the earlier compensation ar-
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if the perspective is taken that there is always the alternative of 
noncontingent compensation, this viewpoint ignores the policy 
reasons behind contingent compensation which is to "encourage 
and compensate extra effort and dedication which can be valua-
ble to a corporation."ll7 There is truth to the argument that con-
tingent compensation can provide a vehicle for "siphoning-off" 
profits but such an intent can readily be discovered by objec-
tively examining the formula in relation to the character and fi-
nancial condition of the corporation. 
An individual who accepts a contingent compensation plan 
may do so out of an interest in seeing the young corporation suc-
ceed. A sole shareholder-employee may exhibit a willingness to 
put off individual reward presently in order to further the corpo-
rate stability. liS This view is especially persuasive in the context 
of a small corporation that is just getting started. 
The court stressed that because the formula might overcom-
pensate in some years and undercompensate in others, the de-
termination of reasonableness should be made with a view of the 
long term results. ll9 This approach will benefit companies which 
have been in existence for a substantial period of time because 
their average compensation over time can be identified and ex-
amined in order to mitigate the tax consequences of a few high 
years. 
A young corporation that initially overcompensates may be 
penalized in the present despite the fact that the formula may 
prove to provide less than adequate compensation in the long 
run. A possible consideration in such a circumstance would be to 
resort to a comparison of the formulas used by like companies, 
for like positions. Such a comparison would yield an idea of the 
average results under such a formula and show whether it is rea-
sonable within the industry. 
The court stated that a formula that was reasonable over a 
rangements as establishing the standard of reasonableness for 
the position in question. 
Walthall, supra note 31 at 24. 
117. 716 F.2d at 1248. 
118. See James J. McHale Co. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ohio 1957). 
119. 716 F.2d at 1248. 
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long period of time should not be deemed unreasonable solely 
because it overcompensates for one or two years. 120 This reason-
ing may plague the Internal Revenue Service as it attempts to 
show overcompensation in cases where only one or two years are 
being examined. Taxpayers with a short corporate history will 
argue that given the benefit of an average extended over, for ex-
ample, ten years, the compensation would be reasonable. 
This argument is not new in the sense that it has been 
presented in cases where the taxpayer has argued that excessive 
compensation was for undercompensated past services.121 The 
difficulty here is in timing because the reasonableness of the 
contingent compensation is tied into its long term average which 
is dependent upon when in the cycle of the corporation the IRS 
issues its notice of deficiency. In a general sense, the reasonable-
ness of anyone amount for anyone year is never completely 
determined until the end of the employee-corporation relation-
ship. From a more pragmatic viewpoint, the comparison of for-
mulas used by like corporations over the same years will be 
fairly helpful. The major problem is finding a corporation which 
the court will accept as being "like" the one in issue. 122 
The court pointed out that changed circumstances may 
make a previously reasonable formula unreasonable. Conversely, 
it would seem plausible for further changes in circumstances to 
make the formula reasonable again. This part of the opinion will 
be susceptible to abuse by both the taxpayer and the IRS. The 
taxpayer will argue that the formula which the IRS labels as un-
reasonable might turn out to be reasonable given a few more 
years. The IRS will argue that the circumstances have changed 
and the fact that the formula was reasonable at inception is now 
120. Id. 
121. "The statute [Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7) does not require that the services should 
be actually rendered during the taxable year, but that the payments therefore shall be 
proper expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year." Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 
281 U.S. 115, 119 (1930). 
122. [T)he courts very narrowly define "like" when considering com-
parative data. For comparative data to be acceptable, the 
courts generally seem to require that the company be of the 
same size and complexity, and that the number of manage-
ment personnel as well as the scope of management responsi-
bility be the same. 
Hoffman, Heeding Significant Factors Improves Odds for Reasonable Compensation, 50 
J. TAX'N 150, 153 (1979). 
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irrelevant. 
Again the timing will be the critical element because the 
court has expanded the issue of reasonableness of annual com-
pensation into the "lifetime" of the corporation-employee rela-
tionship. The much needed support that the opinion lends to 
the area of contingent compensation insures this form of com-
pensation a contuing role in motivating independent business 
persons to take on the risks associated with ownership of a close 
corporation. However, the lack of guidelines for determining the 
relevant time period in which the contingent compensation 
should be scrutinized may make it difficult for new corporations 
to take advantage of this approach. 
New corporations would seem to be the most reasonable 
candidates for contingent compensation and are most in need of 
the benefits of the long term averaging. The court's recommen-
dation of the use of the "independent investor" may prove help-
ful in the analysis of compensation for small corporations with a 
short history. As long as a reasonable return on equity is availa-
ble, the lack of long term averages may not be a hindrance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Elliots the Ninth Circuit reached sound conclusions. 
However, the opinion does not address the issues surrounding 
the applicable time period for determining the reasonableness of 
compensation. The result bolsters the use of contingent compen-
sation but refocuses the controversy to the reasonableness of the 
formula. The analysis, however, is still factual in nature and the 
sole shareholder is well advised to keep accurate records and 
document activities related to compensation. Most importantly, 
the formula should be reviewed from time to time to insure that 
the compensation paid under it is reasonable not only for the 
individual year but for the "lifetime" of the corporation-
employee relationship. 
Stacy Snowman* 
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